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Canoy, Marcel; de Bijl, Paul --- "Access to telecommunications networks" [2004] ELECD 56; in Buigues, A. Pierre; Rey, Patrick (eds), "The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004)

Book Title: The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications

Editor(s): Buigues, A. Pierre; Rey, Patrick

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781843765103

Section: Chapter 8

Section Title: Access to telecommunications networks

Author(s): Canoy, Marcel; de Bijl, Paul

Number of pages: 34

Extract:

8. Access to telecommunications networks
Marcel Canoy, Paul de Bijl and Ron Kemp

There are things known, there are things unknown, in between are doors.
Jim Morrison



1. INTRODUCTION
Access has been a key issue for regulators right from the start of telecommunications market
liberalization. Despite some notable submarket successes, even by 2002 ­ more than ten
years after the first steps towards liberalization ­ incumbent operators still maintain a strong
hold on many aspects of the sector, and infrastructure competition has not matured across
the industry. Most notably, there has been little infrastructure competition within the local
loop, while its unbundling progresses slowly (Buigues, 2002). As a result, incumbent oper-
ators with local loops are able to engage in anticompetitive behaviour, for example by
providing access against unfavourable terms. Because ex post application of the competition
law can have only a limited effect in such situations, regulators are tasked with setting the
terms and conditions of access charges.
Although the legitimacy of involving regulators in access charges can be easily under-
stood, things are a little trickier when it comes to determining just what that involvement
should entail. Tasking them with setting access charges poses particular problems for a
number of reasons. First, the economic theory on determining optimal methods of setting
access charges is not always clear-cut. Second, even in cases where the theory is unequivo-
cal, the practice is not as easy as theory may suggest. The `difficulties of the daily regulation
business' is not just the usual ...


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