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Cseres, Katalin J.; Schinkel, Maarten Pieter; Vogelaar, Floris O.W. --- "Law and Economics of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement: An Introduction" [2006] ELECD 447; in Cseres, J. Katalin; Schinkel, Pieter Maarten; Vogelaar, O.W. Floris (eds), "Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006)

Book Title: Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement

Editor(s): Cseres, J. Katalin; Schinkel, Pieter Maarten; Vogelaar, O.W. Floris

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781845426088

Section: Chapter 1

Section Title: Law and Economics of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement: An Introduction

Author(s): Cseres, Katalin J.; Schinkel, Maarten Pieter; Vogelaar, Floris O.W.

Number of pages: 29

Extract:

1. Law and economics of criminal
antitrust enforcement: an
introduction
Katalin J. Cseres, Maarten Pieter Schinkel
and Floris O.W. Vogelaar

1 INTRODUCTION

Competition laws are set to maintain and protect the competitive process
and allow society to reap its fruits in the form of high quality goods and
services at low prices. A working competitive process is a precious public
benefit that should be safeguarded, as it is well-established that attempts
by firms to pervert competition cause greater overall harm than individual
gain. When firms charge `supra-competitive' prices and reduce output
instead of competing on the market, consumers and economic efficiency
will suffer serious damage.1 Therefore, the primary objective of competition
law enforcement is to keep market parties from being tempted to collude.
It can be met both by facilitating an economic and legal structure that
encourages competition and by actively policing the market for those who
behave anticompetitively regardless. In particular, competition authorities
seek to efficiently deter anticompetitive behaviour through a tuned mix of
enforcement mechanisms.
In merger control, a trajectory of ex ante assessment and licensing serves
to prevent the build-up of undesirable concentrations. Parties report their
intentions to merge at their own initiative, as it is unlikely that a major merger
consummated without being notified and approved will go unnoticed. Little
active policing or sanctioning is required to secure truthful reporting of
relevant information in the required formats.2 However, anticompetitive
agreements and abuses of dominance escape by their very nature the
...