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Book Title: Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement
Editor(s): Cseres, J. Katalin; Schinkel, Pieter Maarten; Vogelaar, O.W. Floris
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN (hard cover): 9781845426088
Section: Chapter 11
Section Title: Optimal Pecuniary Sanctions and the US Sentencing and EU Fining Guidelines
Author(s): Wehmhörner, Nonthika
Number of pages: 22
Extract:
11. Optimal pecuniary sanctions and
the US sentencing and EU fining
guidelines1
Nonthika Wehmhörner
1 INTRODUCTION
In a recent speech to the European Parliament, Neelie Kroes, Commissioner
in charge of Competition Policy, announced that DG Competition is
working on identifying the scope for enhancing the current fining guidelines
in terms of deterrence and transparency.2 Additionally, revamped leniency
programs in 1993 in the US and in 2002 in the EU have led to a large increase
in the number of cases investigated and in fines collected.3 Figure 11.1 shows
the increase in annual fine revenue, with recent `record-breaking' EC fines
such as the fine imposed on Microsoft (nearly 500 million) in 2004 or on
Hoffman La Roche (497 million) in 2001 standing out. Although large
fines are also imposed in the US such as the fine imposed on Hoffman La
Roche (US$500 million) and Infineon Technologies AG (US$160 million),
fine revenue in the EC have been higher than those collected by the US
Department of Justice (DOJ) during the last couple of years.4 Other
sources have confirmed that this is true not just in terms of the total fines
imposed but also in terms of the level of fines in proportion to the amount
of commerce affected.5
One reason for the difference in fine revenue is that fines are only a part
of the arsenal used in the US against price fixing. Other remedies include
restitution, disgorgement, civil damages and criminal penalties ...
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ELECD/2006/457.html