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Book Title: Democracy, Freedom and Coercion
Editor(s): Marciano, Alain; Josselin, Jean-Michel
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN (hard cover): 9781847201263
Section Title: Conclusion: Hobbes and the Political Economy of Power
Number of pages: 16
Extract:
Conclusion: Hobbes and the political
economy of power
Donald Wittman
INTRODUCTION
Is the choice in Iraq between anarchy and a ruthless dictatorship or is there
a middle way? And if there is a middle way in Iraq or elsewhere, what con-
ditions foster such an outcome? The fundamental political problem is that
the power to prevent anarchy is also the power to impose one's will, which
I will refer to as the Hobbesian dilemma. Yet we do observe relatively
benign dictatorships (as in Singapore) and a relative respect for property
and civil rights in the democracies of North America and Western Europe.
Here, I discuss why the choice need not be limited to brutish anarchy and
a self-aggrandizing Leviathan. I also derive the conditions that encourage
the middle solution. At the same time, I explain why dictatorships are
inclined to make bad economic policies.
For a person trained in public choice theory, the puzzle is why govern-
ments are not always repressive military regimes and dictatorships. Public
choice emphasizes the self-interest of bureaucrats, politicians and special
interest groups (typically within a democratic setting). But the net result in
these models is a relatively modest increase in government expenditure (rel-
ative to what the median voter might desire) in favor of the special inter-
ests. Here, we consider a much more profound possibility that arises when
certain segments of society, particularly the military, have the power to
coerce. One would expect that those with military and political power
...
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ELECD/2007/227.html