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Wiener, Jonathan B.; Richman, Barak D. --- "Mechanism Choice" [2010] ELECD 318; in Farber, A. Daniel; O’Connell, Joseph Anne (eds), "Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010)

Book Title: Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law

Editor(s): Farber, A. Daniel; O’Connell, Joseph Anne

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781847206749

Section: Chapter 11

Section Title: Mechanism Choice

Author(s): Wiener, Jonathan B.; Richman, Barak D.

Number of pages: 34

Extract:

11 Mechanism choice
Jonathan B. Wiener1 and Barak D. Richman 2


I. Introduction
Mechanism choice can generally be described as the selection of some way to structure
rules for social behavior. Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin recently described a mechanism as
`an institution, procedure, or game for determining outcomes' (Maskin 2008, 568).
In the realm of public law, mechanism choice is synonymous with `instrument choice'
or policy design. The selection of the policy instrument can be as important to success
or failure as the intended policy outcome. Good intentions or objectives are not enough:
the choice of tools matters. A large and growing literature in instrument choice and
mechanism design examines both the normative criteria for correcting market failures,
matching optimal instruments to different types of problems, minimizing costs, and
overcoming incomplete information; and also the positive political factors that may
influence the actual selection of instruments, and the pattern of such choices across issue
areas, governance systems, and time.
Public policy instruments are selected and designed by public bodies ­ legislatures,
executive agencies, and courts ­ that are comprised of individuals with their own policy
preferences, and that are subject to pressures from private interests through lobbying,
campaign contributions, and elections. Thus, it is no surprise to the student of public law
that the mechanisms actually selected to implement public policy are not necessarily the
ones that best pursue the public interest.
This chapter begins with a brief summary of normative mechanism choice, including
the legal literature on instrument choice and the ...