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Davis, Kevin E. --- "Does the Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law Help Developing Countries?" [2010] ELECD 637; in Faundez, Julio; Tan, Celine (eds), "International Economic Law, Globalization and Developing Countries" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010)

Book Title: International Economic Law, Globalization and Developing Countries

Editor(s): Faundez, Julio; Tan, Celine

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781848441132

Section: Chapter 13

Section Title: Does the Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law Help Developing Countries?

Author(s): Davis, Kevin E.

Number of pages: 24

Extract:

13. Does the globalization of anti-
corruption law help developing
countries?
Kevin E. Davis*

1. INTRODUCTION

What role do foreign institutions play in combating political corruption in
developing countries? This chapter attempts to shed light on this question
by examining the impact on developing countries of the elaborate transna-
tional anti-corruption regime that has emerged in recent years. The cen-
trepieces of that regime are dedicated treaties such as the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development's Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
(`OECD Convention') and the United Nations Convention against
Corruption (`UN Convention'). However, the regime also encompasses a
range of other legal instruments, including the anti-corruption policies of
international financial institutions, components of the international anti-
money laundering regime, international norms governing government
procurement, and private law norms concerning enforcement of corruptly
procured contracts.
The idea that foreign legal institutions can step in and be of assist-
ance when their domestic counterparts are found wanting, which some
might call a form of legal globalization (others might call it `institu-
tional piggy-backing'), is a familiar one in modern legal thought. For
instance, the international investment regime is typically justified by refer-
ence to the idea that investor­state arbitration can usefully compensate



* Beller Family Professor of Business Law, New York University School of
Law. I am grateful for comments on an earlier version from Indira Carr, Robert
Howse, James Jacobs, Guillermo Jorge, and Benedict Kingsbury, as well as Julio
...