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Lande, Robert H. --- "Benefits of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background" [2010] ELECD 741; in Foer, A. Albert; Cuneo, W. Jonathan (eds), "The International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010)

Book Title: The International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law

Editor(s): Foer, A. Albert; Cuneo, W. Jonathan

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781848448773

Section: Chapter 1

Section Title: Benefits of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background

Author(s): Lande, Robert H.

Number of pages: 9

Extract:

1 Benefits of private enforcement: empirical
background1
Robert H. Lande2


Many commentators, especially members of the defense bar, have criticized the existing
United States system of private antitrust litigation. Some assert that private actions all
too often result in remedies that provide lucrative fees for plaintiffs' lawyers but secure no
significant benefits for overcharged victims.3 Others suggest that private litigation merely
follows an easy trail blazed by government enforcers and adds little of public benefit to
government sanctions.4 Yet others contend that, in light of government enforcement,
private cases in the United States lead to excessive deterrence.5 Further, one common


1
This article is a condensation and revision of `Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement:
An Analysis of Forty Cases,' 42 USF. L. Rev. 879 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090661 (hereafter `Benefits: An Analysis'). For summaries of the individ-
ual case studies analyzed in this article see `Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement:
Forty Individual Case Studies,' (hereafter `Benefits: Individual Case Studies'), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523.
2
Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore Law School; Board of Directors,
American Antitrust Institute. The author is grateful to Thomas Weaver for excellent research
assistance.
3
Professor Cavanagh ably summarized this belief: `Many class action suits generate substan-
tial fees for counsel but produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the wrongdoing.
Coupon settlements, wherein plaintiffs settle for "cents off" coupons while their attorneys are ...


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