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Connor, John M. --- "The Impact of International Cartels" [2010] ELECD 742; in Foer, A. Albert; Cuneo, W. Jonathan (eds), "The International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010)

Book Title: The International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law

Editor(s): Foer, A. Albert; Cuneo, W. Jonathan

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781848448773

Section: Chapter 2

Section Title: The Impact of International Cartels

Author(s): Connor, John M.

Number of pages: 15

Extract:

2 The impact of international cartels
John M. Connor1


Introduction
Despite the evident antitrust successes in sanctioning international cartels since 1990,
many remain skeptical about whether current enforcement regimes are capable of
serving the aims of antitrust. Deterrence is the most commonly accepted legal-economic
theory that justifies the passage and enforcement of antitrust laws, and there is emerging
evidence that in some jurisdictions it has a strong role as a practical guide to impos-
ing anti-cartel fines.2 There is also mounting evidence that monetary penalties are at
historically high levels in North America and Western Europe, and at low but rapidly
accelerating levels in key jurisdictions on other continents. That penalties are by most
measures highest in North America is in large part due to the nearly unique availability
and widespread use of private rights of action by cartel victims, further amplified by
severe penalties for individual cartel executives. Optimal deterrence principles imply
that fines, private settlements, and individual criminal penalties are fungible: they are
complementary punishments with respect to their ability to raise the expected costs of
criminal activity.
While deterrence may have improved marginally since the 1990s, there is a near con-
sensus among scholars of modern international cartels that current competition poli-
cies cannot optimally deter cartel behavior because such policies are `oriented towards
addressing harm done in domestic markets . . . [or] merely prohibit cartels without
[sufficiently strong] sanctions.'3 Connor finds that domestic cartel overcharges are so
high and conspiracies so durable that current ...