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Halberstam, Daniel --- "The Promise of Comparative Administrative Law: A Constitutional Perspective on Independent Agencies" [2010] ELECD 814; in Rose-Ackerman, Susan; Lindseth, L. Peter (eds), "Comparative Administrative Law" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010)

Book Title: Comparative Administrative Law

Editor(s): Rose-Ackerman, Susan; Lindseth, L. Peter

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781848446359

Section: Chapter 12

Section Title: The Promise of Comparative Administrative Law: A Constitutional Perspective on Independent Agencies

Author(s): Halberstam, Daniel

Number of pages: 20

Extract:

12 The promise of comparative administrative law: a
constitutional perspective on independent agencies
Daniel Halberstam*


The role of so-called `independent administrative agencies' in democratic governance,
and the study of their practical importance and normative significance, are on the rise
in many jurisdictions. In the United States, the administrative state never ceases to be
the object of fresh critical scholarly discussion as well as practical efforts at reform.
Within European states, such as England, France, and Germany, renewed attention is
being given to the role of independent agencies (sometimes termed QUANGOS) in law
enforcement, adjudication, and rulemaking ­ often in connection with European man-
dates of administration. At the supranational level of governance, the European Union
itself has witnessed a dramatic explosion of agencies over the past decade as well. And
at the international level writ large, the creation, migration, and enforcement of norms
has increasingly taken place within an ever expanding network of agencies that challenge
us to understand (or, better, question whether we should understand) global governance
within the paradigm of administrative law as well.
The United States, with its long tradition of independent agencies often serves as a
point of reference in these discussions (for example, Geradin 2004). Although there is
no general authoritative definition, such agencies are understood to operate somewhat
separately from the executive branch structure and to be somewhat insulated from the
executive branch hierarchy, often taking the form of a bipartisan body of Commissioners
whom the President can remove only `for cause' (Breger and ...