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Gómez, Fernando --- "Cooperation, Long-term Relationships and Open-endedness in Contractual Networks" [2011] ELECD 278; in Cafaggi, Fabrizio (ed), "Contractual Networks, Inter-Firm Cooperation and Economic Growth" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011)

Book Title: Contractual Networks, Inter-Firm Cooperation and Economic Growth

Editor(s): Cafaggi, Fabrizio

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781848448896

Section: Chapter 2

Section Title: Cooperation, Long-term Relationships and Open-endedness in Contractual Networks

Author(s): Gómez, Fernando

Number of pages: 18

Extract:

2. Cooperation, long-term
relationships and open-endedness in
contractual networks*
Fernando Gómez**

1. INTRODUCTION

Unless the world current economic turmoil and its aftermath forces a reas-
sessment of the situation, there seems to be a growing consensus among
economists and organization theorists, based on empirical evidence, that
contract has been gaining ground over ownership and authority as a means
of organizing economic activity.1 In the old Coasean dichotomy between
contract and firm,2 the former appears to be on the increase, though not
necessarily in the neo-classical form of arm's-length contractual exchanges
in the short term, but through more complex and extended relationships in
which contractual links become components of networks of relationships.
These networks may take and operate in different shapes and forms.3
What remains central in contract networks, as with economic exchange
more generally, is the need to create a framework favourable to the devel-
opment of means and tools to induce and sustain cooperation among the
different participating agents. In fact, it is the failure to cooperate and the



* I am grateful to Fabrizio Cafaggi, and to participants in the workshop at
the European University Institute, for helpful discussions of the ideas reflected in
this chapter, and to the Spanish Ministry of Innovation and Science for financial
support, under grants SEJ2007-60503 and SEJ2005-10041, and to Marian Gili for
excellent research assistance.
** Professor of Law and Economics, School of Law, Universitat Pompeu
Fabra. Ramon Trias Fargas 25­7, 08005 ...