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Eilmansberger, Thomas --- "Competition Law Issues Concerning Related Markets and their Treatment under EU Competition Law" [2011] ELECD 747; in Drexl, Josef; Grimes, S. Warren; Jones, A. Clifford; Peritz, J.R. Rudolph; Swaine, T. Edward (eds), "More Common Ground for International Competition Law?" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011)

Book Title: More Common Ground for International Competition Law?

Editor(s): Drexl, Josef; Grimes, S. Warren; Jones, A. Clifford; Peritz, J.R. Rudolph; Swaine, T. Edward

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781849803946

Section: Chapter 7

Section Title: Competition Law Issues Concerning Related Markets and their Treatment under EU Competition Law

Author(s): Eilmansberger, Thomas

Number of pages: 25

Extract:

7. Competition law issues concerning
related markets and their treatment
under EU competition law
Thomas Eilmansberger

1 INTRODUCTION

Most products are useless on a stand-alone basis and depend on other
products (or services) to fulfil their function. The mere fact, however, that
a good can be used only together or in connection with another good does
not as such impact on consumer choice and competition in the markets
concerned. The situation may be different if such necessarily combined
use makes significant demands on the design or functionality of one or
both products in question. Such compatibility requirements frequently
arise with regard to products (`secondary products') that are complemen-
tary in the sense that their purpose is to make another product or service
(`primary product') function in a better way or at all.1 There appear to be
basically two types of secondary product that have to meet such compat-
ibility demands (typically created by certain technical properties of the
primary product), namely (i) products that are destined to eventually
either become an integral part of or be attached to another product,2 and
(ii) products enabling another product to do its job and fulfil its basic
function.3
It is obvious that such compatibility requirements, or more precisely,
the resulting interfaces, have the potential to restrict access to the product
markets concerned. That applies, in particular, if the interface can somehow
be controlled by the maker of the primary product. It is thus not surprising
that antitrust enforcement in ...