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Gunningham, Neil --- "Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement: Responsive Regulation and Beyond" [2011] ELECD 939; in Parker, Christine; Nielsen, Lehmann Vibeke (eds), "Explaining Compliance" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011)

Book Title: Explaining Compliance

Editor(s): Parker, Christine; Nielsen, Lehmann Vibeke

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781848448858

Section: Chapter 9

Section Title: Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement: Responsive Regulation and Beyond

Author(s): Gunningham, Neil

Number of pages: 23

Extract:

9. Strategizing compliance and
enforcement: responsive regulation
and beyond
Neil Gunningham

INTRODUCTION

Effective enforcement is vital to the successful implementation of social
legislation, as legislation that is not enforced rarely fulfils its social objec-
tives. This chapter examines the question of how the enforcement task
might be best conducted in order to achieve policy outcomes that are effec-
tive (in terms of reducing the incidence of social harm) and efficient (cost
the least to both duty holders and the regulator), while also maintaining
community confidence.
It begins by summarizing the two strategies that for many years domi-
nated the debate about enforcement strategy, that is, whether the more
appropriate strategy for regulators is to `punish or persuade.' Recognizing
the deficiencies of this dichotomy, this chapter explores a number of more
recent approaches that have proved increasingly influential on the policy
debate. Such an examination must begin with John Braithwaite's seminal
contribution in favor of `responsive regulation.' His approach conceives
of regulation in terms of a dialogic culture in which regulators signal to
industry their commitment to escalate their enforcement response when-
ever lower levels of intervention fail (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). Under
this model regulators begin by assuming virtue (to which they respond
with cooperative measures), but when their expectations are disappointed
they respond with progressively punitive or coercive strategies until the
regulatee conforms. This approach is taken further by Gunningham
and Grabosky (1998) in Smart Regulation. `Smart regulation' accepts
Braithwaite's arguments as to the benefits of escalating ...


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