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Garoupa, Nuno --- "The Economics of Prosecutors" [2012] ELECD 569; in Harel, Alon; Hylton, N. Keith (eds), "Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012)

Book Title: Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law

Editor(s): Harel, Alon; Hylton, N. Keith

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781848443747

Section: Chapter 9

Section Title: The Economics of Prosecutors

Author(s): Garoupa, Nuno

Number of pages: 12

Extract:

9 The economics of prosecutors
Nuno Garoupa*


1. INTRODUCTION

The role of prosecutors in any given legal system is of critical importance in enforcing
and effectively applying the law ­ criminal law in particular, as well as other areas of the
law such as family law1 and class action litigation.2 The exact nature of the work per-
formed by prosecutors and their institutional organizations varies across legal systems.
Surprisingly, economists have studied prosecutors very little when compared to other
legal and judicial professions.3
For a long time, the efficient prosecutor model has prevailed in law and econom-
ics, in particular since the publication of foundational works by Landes (1971) and
Easterbrook (1983). Only more recently have economists started looking at prosecutors'
preferences and behavior, and at their role in shaping the legal system.4 For example,
in the efficient prosecutor model, it only makes sense to provide full discretion to the
prosecutor, particularly in the prosecution of more meritorious cases, in order to achieve
efficient deterrence. Therefore, most rules of criminal procedure limiting the role of the
prosecutor are inevitably inappropriate. Such was the general reasoning of the law and
economics literature until recently.5
A more realistic economic model of prosecutors requires a deeper understanding of
preferences, incentives, and institutional contexts. As with any other economic agent,
we need to establish the preferences of prosecutors. At the same time, in order to explain
their behavior, we must attend to the institutional incentives and constraints.
This chapter proposes that ...