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Ginsburg, Tom; Alston, Eric --- "Playing for constitutional time: Interim constitutions and transitional provisions" [2017] ELECD 553; in Fagan, Frank; Levmore, Saul (eds), "The Timing of Lawmaking" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 110

Book Title: The Timing of Lawmaking

Editor(s): Fagan, Frank; Levmore, Saul

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781785364327

Section: Chapter 5

Section Title: Playing for constitutional time: Interim constitutions and transitional provisions

Author(s): Ginsburg, Tom; Alston, Eric

Number of pages: 20

Abstract/Description:

Regime transition is a central challenge in constitutional design. This chapter discusses two increasingly popular mechanisms to effectuate the transition between regimes: (i) interim constitutions; and (ii) transitional provisions. Both mechanisms involve the manipulation of temporality, limiting duration of what is supposed to be an enduring form. This chapter provides a theory of when these devices are useful, positive evidence of their use in national constitutions, and a discussion of normative considerations. Keywords: timing rules, constitutional transition, interim constitutions, transitional provisions