

# Law and Literature: Walking the Boundary with Robert Frost and the Supreme Court



KIERAN DOLIN<sup>†</sup>

*This article, which is the opening chapter of a book-length study entitled An Introduction to Law and Literature to be published by Cambridge University Press, argues that literature and law are adjacent fields, and that the border between them is a shifting one. As a case study it explores the significance of a quotation from the poet Robert Frost which is invoked by two Justices of the United States Supreme Court in a constitutional case.*

**I**N April 1995 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm Incorporated*.<sup>1</sup> The case began in 1987 when Mr and Mrs Plaut and some other investors in Spendthrift Farm alleged that it had committed fraud and deceit when selling stock, contrary to section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934. The District Court in Kentucky held that this suit was time-barred, following a recent Supreme Court decision in the case of *Lampf*,<sup>2</sup> which declared that such suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years of the violation itself. After this judgment became final, Congress enacted a new section 27A(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, providing that any action commenced before *Lampf*,

<sup>†</sup> Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of Western Australia.

1. 514 US 211 (1995).

2. *Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Drupis & Petigrow v Gibertson* 501 US 350 (1991).

but dismissed thereafter as time-barred, could be reinstated. The Plaunts moved for reinstatement accordingly, but the District Court held that section 27A(b) was unconstitutional. This decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal and by the Supreme Court.

This case, like all legal cases, involves a story.<sup>3</sup> While it begins as a story of disappointed investors attempting to obtain redress for a wrong that has damaged them, the conflict shifts onto a new level after the failure of the initial suit. With the attempted reinstatement, both Plaut and Spendthrift Farm in effect become proxies for a contest between the judiciary and the Congress. The Plaunts' motion for the reinstatement of their action was defeated not in terms of securities law but on constitutional grounds. Three courts found that section 27A(b) contravened the US Constitution's separation of powers in that it required federal courts to re-open final judgments entered before its enactment. The Constitution forbids the legislature to interfere with courts' final judgments. Congress had trespassed into the judicial realm with this law, which was therefore held to be invalid.

This legal story acquires a distinctly literary element in the judgments of the Supreme Court. Writing the opinion of the majority, Scalia J concluded his account of the legal authorities with a summary that relied equally on metaphor and logic: 'In its major features ... [separation of powers] is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of inter-branch conflict'.<sup>4</sup> In expounding legal principle and justifying his decision, Scalia J employs the rhetorical tools of metaphor and narrative. His metaphor of the wall represents the judicial power in the Constitution as a fortified city under assault from a hostile Congress or Executive. His exposition of the law rests on an implied, imagined narrative of battle. There is nothing extraordinary about Scalia J's procedure here: this is a normal instance of judicial reasoning in a run-of-the-mill case. Judges and lawyers routinely seek to clarify their pronouncements and arguments about the law by resorting to metaphors and stories. They do so because law is inevitably a matter of language. The law can only be articulated in words and, as such, 'can never escape the intricacies and imprecisions, as well as the promise and power, of language itself'.<sup>5</sup> While the order of a court will be imposed on the body or the property of the parties to the case, it will originally have been spoken as a sentence. This is the fundamental connection between law and literature.

---

3. For an introduction to legal narrative studies, see P Brooks & P Gewirtz (eds) *Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1996).

4. *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm* above n 1, 239.

5. A Sarat & TR Kearns 'Editorial Introduction' in *The Rhetoric of Law* (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1994) 1-2. All the essays in this edited collection offer insightful analyses of legal language.

However, the legal language of *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm* also manifests an unusual degree of engagement with the literary realm. Having invoked the metaphor of the wall, Scalia J seeks support for his formulation of the law by citing a well-known literary analogue: ‘separation of powers, a distinctively American political doctrine, profits from the advice authored by a distinctively American poet: Good fences make good neighbours’.<sup>6</sup> Scalia J assumes that he and his readers share a common culture and that they will be able to recognise his allusion to Robert Frost’s poem, ‘Mending Wall.’ What is most interesting about this part of his opinion is its recognition that law is an aspect of this ‘distinctively American’ culture that he invokes. The judge grounds the authority of the law of separation of powers not just in legal precedent, but in the national cultural heritage. Political theory, history and literature combine to authorise and authenticate this law, and locate it in a larger narrative. While most judgments refer only to statutes and past cases, implying the independence and autonomy of law, Scalia J’s allusion exposes how legal values and concepts are embedded in a broader and more diverse web of meanings. In this incidental rhetorical flourish, he makes a rare acknowledgment of the formative power of cultural context upon the law, confirming Robert M Cover’s insight that, ‘No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning’.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, Scalia J’s use of poetry is revealing: he brings it into the public sphere, as a kind of ally of law. Literature and law, it seems, can work together in the production of cultural ideals and values.

Another member of the court, Breyer J, concurred with the majority decision, but qualified their statement of the doctrine, and in doing so questioned their understanding of the poem. He cautioned against ‘the unnecessary building of such walls’ as ‘in itself dangerous, because the Constitution blends, as well as separates, powers in its efforts to create a government that will work for, as well as protect the liberties of, its citizens’.<sup>8</sup> He finds that past cases provide other metaphors than the wall: citing *Springer v Philippine Islands*<sup>9</sup> he argues that the doctrine does not ‘divide the branches into watertight compartments,’ nor ‘establish and divide separate fields of black and white’.<sup>10</sup> In refining the meaning of ‘separation of powers,’ Breyer J also takes issue with the majority’s use of Robert Frost’s poem to bolster their decision: ‘One might consider as well that poet’s caution, for he not only notes that ‘Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,’ but also writes, ‘Before I built a wall I’d ask to know/What I was walling in or walling out’.<sup>11</sup> The poet’s belief in walls is not as clear-cut as Scalia J believed.

---

6. *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm* above n 1, 240.

7. RM Cover ‘Foreword: *Nomos* and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harvard L Rev 4.

8. *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm* above n 1, 245.

9. 277 US 189 (1928) 209, 211.

10. *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm* above n 1, 245.

11. *Ibid.*

This unusual judicial dispute over the meaning of a poem was reported in the *New York Times* and in *Mediator*, the bulletin of the Law and Humanities Institute.<sup>12</sup> To quote the latter: 'It is always a treat, and a rare one at that, to see the Supreme Court intertwine legal and poetic judgments'.<sup>13</sup> The Law and Humanities Institute aims to foster an understanding of law's interrelations with literature. Underpinning its celebratory note on the case is a belief that poetry has a proper, but generally unacknowledged, role to play in public debates, that literature has something to offer the law in its resolution of social conflicts. By evidencing the 'intertwining' of legal and literary language so clearly, the case of *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm* provides an excellent introduction to the study of law and literature.

However, it is not only the Supreme Court justices' common interest in the poem which is significant; their different interpretations of it are even more instructive. While Robert Frost's 'Mending Wall' is widely known, a substantial quotation will assist our understanding of the text and its relevance to the law. Two farmers walk along their common boundary 'at spring mending-time,' replacing the fallen stones of the fence:

There where it is we do not need the wall:  
 He is all pine and I am apple orchard.  
 My apple trees will never get across  
 And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.  
 He only says, 'good fences make good neighbours.'  
 Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder  
 If I could put a notion in his head:  
 'Why do they make good neighbors? Isn't it  
 Where there are cows? But here there are no cows.  
 Before I built a wall I'd ask to know  
 What I was walling in or walling out,  
 And to whom I was like to give offense.  
 Something there is that doesn't love a wall,  
 That wants it down'....  
 He moves in darkness as it seems to me,  
 Not of woods only and the shade of trees.  
 He will not go behind his father's saying,  
 And he likes having thought of it so well  
 He says again, 'Good fences make good neighbors'.<sup>14</sup>

---

12. See 'Supreme Court Poetry Seminar' *Mediator* XI/XII (Jun 1995) 4. I am indebted to this article for first drawing my attention to this case.

13. *Ibid.*

14. R Frost 'Mending Wall' in EC Lathem (ed) *The Poetry of Robert Frost* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969) 33-34.

Scalia and Breyer JJ uncannily re-enact the roles of the two farmers. Scalia J repeats the proverb, ‘Good fences make good neighbours’,<sup>15</sup> and attributes it to Robert Frost, completely neglecting the context of the poem. Breyer J asks the sceptical questions while re-building the wall, noting that Frost doubts the wisdom of the wall, whilst agreeing with Scalia J to apply the separation of powers doctrine to this case. Breyer J’s opinion exposes a rift between the poem and the law: to agree on the law but disagree on the poem either cancels out the significance of the poem, or it undermines the metaphoric wall of the separation of powers doctrine.

In exploring this contradiction, we can begin by examining the judges’ assumptions about poetry. Scalia J seems to see poetry as didactic, as a repository of quotable moral and political truths, ‘what oft was thought but ne’er so well exprest,’ to quote another poet whose lines have become proverbial.<sup>16</sup> What he calls the ‘advice’ offered by Frost conforms with the wisdom of American political doctrine; indeed the law ‘profits from’ the poetic statement. In this view poetry is sententious: its moralising maxims harmonise with the task of applying legal rules. Modern poetry does not fit this description, and Frost’s poem is primarily a narrative in which two opposite viewpoints on the events being recounted are aired. Frost discouraged moralistic readings of this poem in a 1944 interview, saying there was no ‘rigid separation between right and wrong. “Mending Wall” simply contrasts two types of people’.<sup>17</sup> The following year he emphasised this ambivalence: ‘Twice I say “Good fences” and twice “Something there is”’.<sup>18</sup> Breyer J picks up on the anti-sententious note in Frost’s poem, in which the speaker is tempted to undermine his neighbour’s belief in the value of fences, by questioning, ‘Why do they make good neighbors?’ Breyer J still wants some sort of guidance from the poem but, in correcting Scalia J, he is faced with the unconventional implication that the boundary fence does not matter. This would have startling implications for the separation of powers, not to mention the law of real property. Faced with these difficulties, Breyer J can only emphasise ‘the poet’s caution’.<sup>19</sup> We might call this the minimalist position; but we should nonetheless recognise his awareness of the complex meanings of the poem, and his refusal of any straightforward application of poem to law. The combination of literary text and legal context is a volatile one. One can imagine the consequences if Breyer J followed through the implications of his reading of Frost’s poem and devalued the legal precedents. I read his ‘caution’ as putting a narrow interpretation on the poem, and in effect as maintaining the wall between law and literature.

---

15. *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm* above n 1, 240.

16. A Pope ‘An Essay on Criticism’ (1711) 1, 298. See J Butt (ed) *The Poems of Alexander Pope* (London: Methuen, 1963) 153.

17. JS Cramer *Robert Frost Among His Poems: A Literary Companion to the Poet’s Own Biographical Contexts and Associations* (Jefferson: McFarland & Co, 1996) 30.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Frost above n 14.

The existence of this wall can be elucidated by a closer reading of Frost's poem. Frost described 'Mending Wall' as a 'parable,' but kept 'the secret of what it means' to himself.<sup>20</sup> However, we may approach a statement of its meaning by noting that the poem's speaker sees a contest between unknown forces in nature that dislodge the stones and inherited cultural practices which demand the rebuilding of the structure. He aligns himself with scepticism and freedom, and his neighbour with custom and traditional authority. The language of each is appropriate to his ethic, one tentative and exploratory, the other proverbial and inherited:

He only says, 'Good fences make good neighbors'.  
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder  
If I could put a notion in his head.<sup>21</sup>

The speaker's complaint against the man of maxims is literature's challenge to law: the challenge offered by a self-consciously creative domain, where alternative voices can be heard, where hypothetical situations can be explored, and where the settled questions of society can be re-opened through the medium of fiction. He imagines a different world, and poses questions: what if ... ? why ... ? His mischievous approach matches Jonathan Culler's description of literature as:

An institution based on the possibility of saying anything you can imagine....  
[F]or any orthodoxy, any belief, any value, a literary work can mock it, parody it,  
imagine some different and monstrous fiction.<sup>22</sup>

Equally, the other farmer is speaking the law. He accepts the rule that 'good fences make good neighbours.' The proverb is a catchy phrase that carries the force of belief, that compels acceptance and a certain course of action. He does not question its truth, but respects its authority as something handed down from his forefathers. For him, the proverb is sufficient and complete: nothing more, nothing else, need be said. In recognising the archaic origin and 'darkness' of this mental enclosure, Frost intuitively key features of all authoritative language. According to the great Russian theorist of language and literature, MM Bakhtin:

The authoritative word is located in a distanced zone, organically connected with a past that is felt to be hierarchically higher. It is, so to speak, the word of the fathers.... It is a *prior* discourse. It is therefore not a question of choosing it from other possible discourses that are its equal. It is given in lofty spheres, not those of familiar contact.<sup>23</sup>

---

20. Cramer above n 17, 30.

21. Frost above n 14.

22. J Culler *Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: OUP, 1997) 40.

23. MM Bakhtin 'Discourse in the Novel' in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* (Austin: Texas UP, 1981) 342.

From Mount Sinai to the bench and bar of the world's Supreme Courts, the law is emphatically an instance of the authoritative word. Like the neighbour, it permits 'no play with its borders'.<sup>24</sup>

The repair of the wall is a declaration of the importance of the boundary as a marker of the limits of property, of what land each can call his own, and what is acknowledged as the other's. However, in debating the value of walls the poem symbolises not only the law's upholding of private property, but its fundamental reliance on boundaries. As the editors of a recent guide to socio-legal studies observe:

In its basic operations, law attempts to create, police, and occasionally transgress social, spatial and temporal boundaries. The pre-eminent declaration of a legal system – its announcement of its own existence – establishes jurisdictional boundaries within which its authority prevails. This definition of a geographical space is matched by the declaration of temporal boundaries (statutes of limitation, ages of minority and majority, retroactive or prospective application of statutes or case law) within which legal authority is exercised. Within law's spatio-temporal grid, complex systems of classification are established, creating boundaries that define individuals, communities, acts, and norms: Who is a criminal? A citizen? A victim of negligence? A person or group entitled to legal protection or remedy?<sup>25</sup>

The inseparability of laws and walls was recognized by the ancient Greeks. Plato invokes 'Zeus the protector of boundaries' to authorise the first of his agricultural laws: 'No man shall disturb the boundary-stones of his neighbour, whether fellow-citizen or foreigner'.<sup>26</sup> Hannah Arendt traces the importance of the wall as a symbol of law from Heraclitus to Montesquieu, and insists that its borders are always under pressure, due to 'action's inherent tendency to establish relations, force open limitations and cut across boundaries'.<sup>27</sup>

An understanding of 'Mending Wall' in this context reveals what was at stake for the Supreme Court in *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm*: the policing of temporal and institutional boundaries that had been deliberately transgressed; the defence of intrinsic legal and judicial functions. Little wonder that Scalia J imagined the two branches of government as warring states, far removed from the civil dialogue and co-operation of Frost's farmers. The more tempered approach of Breyer J is shown in his adoption of the literary 'side' of the argument, his willingness to evaluate the need for the wall: 'Before I built a wall I'd ask to know/What I was walling in or walling out/And to whom I was like to give offense.' Like the speaker in the poem, he

---

24. Ibid, 343.

25. A Sarat, M Constable et al (eds) *Crossing Boundaries: Traditions and Transformations in Law and Society Research* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1998) 3-4 (footnotes omitted).

26. Plato *The Laws* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970; TJ Saunders (trans)) 343.

27. H Arendt *The Human Condition* (Chicago: CUP, 1958) 63, 190.

upholds the wall in its customary place despite his openness to change. 'Mending Wall' sets the language of proverbial truth and authority against the language of possibility. What the 'Supreme Court Poetry Seminar' suggests is that while both languages are available at law, the former is more likely to prevail. The questions posed by Frost's speaker and invoked by Breyer J are among the vital questions literature can ask of law.

If we follow Culler in thinking of literature as 'an institution based on the possibility of saying anything you can imagine',<sup>28</sup> must we conclude that, unlike law, literature is hostile to boundaries? A moment's reflection suggests not. The distinction between poetry, fiction and drama; the sub-divisions of each of these genres – including novel and romance, sonnet and haiku, tragedy and comedy; the evaluative distinctions between high and low art – poetry as against doggerel, drama and melodrama, or Graham Greene's division of his fiction into novels and entertainments;<sup>29</sup> and the fundamental boundary between literary and other writing are all examples of literature's dependence on external and internal boundaries for its identity and its everyday functioning. Yet we can readily see that these boundaries seem made to be transgressed, at least by modern writers: the verse-novel, the dramatic monologue, tragicomedy, the non-fiction novel, are only the most obvious of many experiments in form and discourse. The Italian writer and critic Claudio Magris, a native of the city of Trieste, on the border of what used to be 'Western' and 'Eastern' Europe, has reflected on the relationship between writing and boundaries:

Boundaries between states and nations, established by international treaties or by force, are not the only kind. The pen that scribbles on from day to day ... traces boundaries, moves, dissolves and restores them ... Literature is intrinsically a frontier and an expedition in search of new frontiers, to shift them and define them. Every literary form and expression is a threshold, a zone at the edge of countless different elements, tensions and movements, a shifting of the semantic borders and grammatical structures, a perpetual dismantling and reassembly of the world, its frames and its pictures.<sup>30</sup>

Magris acknowledges the value of boundaries as well as their limits in this capacious and socially-alert description of literature. In his view, literary texts can question traditional borders and distinctions; writing is an engagement with and an extension of existing boundaries. His passionate and idealistic reflection is useful for its insight that boundaries are dissolved and re-formed in and by literature.

---

28. Culler above n 22.

29. For a succinct account of this division, see P O'Prey *A Reader's Guide to Graham Greene* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1988) 43.

30. C Magris 'Who is on the Other Side? Considerations about Frontiers' in C MacLehose (ed) *Frontiers* (London: Harper Collins, 1994) 22.



Whether Magris's argument is overstated, whether all texts produced in the literary field possess the openness and exploratory quality that he claims, may be questioned.<sup>31</sup> His insistence on literature's 'tracing' of boundaries, its drawing attention to borders and their effects, however, is illustrated with great clarity by many texts, including Frost's 'Mending Wall'. More than this, when the literary elements of legal writing are acknowledged, a similar 'dismantling and reassembly' of the law's boundaries can be seen to occur, which accounts for the contradictions in Breyer J's opinion in *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm*.

For literary scholars and critics, too, a consciousness of the role of frames and boundaries has transformed their studies:

Foregrounding the issue of boundaries has reminded us that literature is not something given once and for all but something constructed and reconstructed.... Not only is the canon of literary works in any genre fashioned by a simultaneous perambulation and transgression of boundaries but the very concept of the literary is itself continually renegotiated. Any study of literature, then, is necessarily bound up implicitly or explicitly with an interrogation of imaginary boundaries: their identification or definition, the regulation of what may cross them and at what times and under what circumstances, the alarms that go off when unauthorized crossings occur, and so forth.<sup>32</sup>

This awareness of barriers and their effects, especially the realisation of modes of inclusion and exclusion, abounds in traditional and modern literary representations of law, as the most cursory review shows. Sophocles' *Antigone* begins with the dilemma created by the unburied body of Polynices, declared a traitor by his uncle Creon, and condemned by his edict to rot outside the city walls. Antigone elects to defy that law, and cross the boundary marking his expulsion from the polity, with fateful consequences for herself and her society.<sup>33</sup> The action of Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* shows how the racial and religious difference of Shylock the Jew forms an ethical barrier for the Venetians, which is reinforced by laws subjecting him to special penalties as a so-called alien.<sup>34</sup> Kafka's brief and mysterious parable, 'Before the Law,' imagines the citizen seeking the aid of the law as eternally waiting outside its walls, never gaining admittance, let alone justice.<sup>35</sup> Works like these may

- 
31. For a lawyer's argument that English literature is deeply 'antinomian' or hostile to law, see A Julius 'Dickens the Law-breaker' (1998) 40(3) *Critical Quarterly* 63.
  32. G Gunn & S Greenblatt *Redrawing the Boundaries: The Transformation of English and American Literary Studies* (New York: Modern Languages Assoc, 1992) 5.
  33. Sophocles *Antigone* in EF Watling (ed) *The Theban Plays* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1947).
  34. W Shakespeare *The Merchant of Venice* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987; MM Mahood (ed)).
  35. F Kafka 'Before the Law' in N Glatzer (ed) *The Penguin Complete Short Stories of Franz Kafka* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983).

question the boundaries established by the law, or they may simply reflect such boundaries. In either case, it is the ability of literary texts to represent and draw attention to such boundaries and how they function that produces their greatest insights into law.

The judicial appropriations of Frost's 'Mending Wall' suggest that law and literature are adjoining fields, divided by a boundary fence that keeps breaking down, despite regular maintenance. The common ground of language resists the forms and divisions imposed on it, opening 'gaps even two can pass abreast'.<sup>36</sup> This resistance creates opportunities for dialogue between the two disciplines, for licensed or unlicensed wanderings across the border, for 'subversion' as well as surveillance.<sup>37</sup> Frost directs our attention to the nature of borders, and to the various relations and exchanges they make possible. Claudio Magris has observed how the experience of a border can shift: 'At one moment it is a bridge on which to meet, at another, a barrier of rejection'.<sup>38</sup> As we shall see, the border between law and literature has sometimes functioned as a bridge, promoting dialogue, and at others served as a barrier inhibiting it.

However frequent the exchanges, however open the frontier between literature and law, it does not imply that the two fields are identical. Just as 'He is all pine and I am apple orchard,' so we can think of literature and law as different uses of language. Brook Thomas makes this point forcefully in his closely reasoned 'Thoughts on the Law and Literature Revival': 'Without a doubt legal texts can have literary qualities. But in the last analysis their function is different'.<sup>39</sup> A useful approach to the variety of functions or uses of language is provided by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of 'language-games.' Among the 'multiplicity of language-games' listed in his *Philosophical Investigations* are 'Giving orders, and obeying them ... Reporting an event ... [and] Making up a story and reading it.' He explains that 'the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life'.<sup>40</sup> As distinct linguistic forms of life, law and literature speak different kinds of sentences: one commanding obedience under threat of punishment, the other inviting pleasurable recognition and assent. The speaker of legal sentences has an 'imperative to issue exclusive judgments,' to quote Thomas again;<sup>41</sup> while the creator of literary texts

---

36. Frost above n 14, 33.

37. On subversion in Frost's text, see R Poirier *Robert Frost: The Work of Knowing* (Oxford: OUP, 1977) 106.

38. C Magris above n 30, 9.

39. B Thomas 'Thoughts on the Law and Literature Revival' (1991) 17 *Critical Inquiry* 533.

40. L Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* vol 1 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974; GEM Anscombe (trans)) 11e-12e.

41. Thomas above n 39, n 43.

may suspend judgment in favour of inclusivity and dialogue, as the Frost poem shows.

If these obvious and fundamental differences appear at first glance to locate the two language types at a distance from each other, the example of *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm* shows how the legal form of life produces several kinds of sentence, narrative and hortatory, as well as imperative. Equally, despite WH Auden's poetic disclaimer, 'For poetry makes nothing happen: it survives/In the valley of its saying/Where executives would never want to tamper,' the example of 'Mending Wall' shows how a statement which has the integration, compression and mnemonic quality of literary language ('*Good fences make good neighbours*') can encode values and govern conduct, can enchant judges, and provoke dissent outside the apparently sequestered 'valley of its saying'.<sup>42</sup> As different forms of life, they enable different understandings of the world, or to give due weight to the organic metaphor they construct reality differently.

Auden was probably right in thinking that not many business executives read poetry (or bought his books). Since the deaths of Tennyson and Kipling it has become an increasingly specialist activity. However, specialisation does not imply seclusion. Gillian Beer points to the inevitableness and plurality of cultural encounters in society:

Train-spotters, mothers of babies, astronomers, horse-riders have each their special knowledges and vocabularies; but none of them lives as train-spotter, mother, astronomer, horse-rider alone. Each inhabits and draws on the experience of the historical moment, the material base, the media, and community in which they all dwell.<sup>43</sup>

Although Beer's interest is in border crossings between science and literature, her vision of multiple relations, roles and vocabularies, and her insistence that these can only be understood in the light of the particular 'historical moment' in which the individual lived are equally useful to the interdisciplinary study of law and literature. Understandings of literature and of law have changed throughout history, and Beer argues that interdisciplinary activity promotes change:

Interdisciplinary studies do not produce closure. Their stories emphasize not simply the circulation of intact ideas across a larger community but transformation: the transformations undergone when ideas enter other genres or different reading groups, the destabilizing of knowledge once it escapes from the initial group of co-workers, its tendency to mean more and other than could have been foreseen.<sup>44</sup>

---

42. WH Auden 'In Memory of WB Yeats' in E Mendelson (ed) *The English Auden* (New York: Random House, 1977) 241–243.

43. G Beer *Open Fields: Science in Cultural Encounter* (Oxford: OUP, 1996) 1.

44. *Ibid*, 115.

For almost three decades the opportunity of cross-border travel broached by Frost's persona has been exploited by a fertile interdisciplinary project in *Law and Literature*.<sup>45</sup> One of the fundamental propositions of this movement was succinctly put by Richard Weisberg and Jean-Pierre Barricelli in a pioneering essay: 'Law is associated with Literature from its inception as a formalized attempt to structure reality through language'.<sup>46</sup> Several such structures and associations have been identified by scholars working at the border of the two fields, including:

- (i) literary representations of legal trials, practitioners and language, and of those caught up in the law;
- (ii) the role played by narrative, metaphor and other rhetorical devices in legal judgments;
- (iii) how the freedom of literary expression is contained and regulated by laws;
- (iv) the circulation of legal ideas in literary culture, and vice versa in various periods and societies;
- (v) the effects of social ideologies such as race and gender in legal language;
- (vi) theories of interpretation;
- (vii) the use of theatricality and spectacle in the creation of legal authority;
- (viii) the cultural and political consequences of new technologies of communication, such as writing, the printing press and the internet;
- (ix) legal story-telling or narrative jurisprudence.

Thus the border between law and literature has become a bridge, which will enable even more connections to be discerned, and, if Beer is correct, produce further transformations in both fields.

Not all participants in the 'Law and Literature project' have shared this expansive vision. Robert M Cover, whose article '*Nomos and Narrative*'<sup>47</sup> inaugurated narrative jurisprudence, subsequently issued a forceful caveat against the idealistic assimilation of law with literature. 'Judges,' he insisted, 'sit atop a pyramid of violence'.<sup>48</sup> The texts of the law have immediate bodily consequences for the condemned. This fact ensures the difference between the two fields. The case for

---

45. See RH Weisberg 'Literature's Twenty-Year Crossing into the Domain of Law: Continuing Trespass or Right by Adverse Possession?' in M Freeman & A Lewis (eds) *Law and Literature* (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 48-61. For the dynamic and multifaceted notion of a Law and Literature project, I am indebted to M Aristodemou *Law and Literature: Journeys from Her to Eternity* (Oxford: OUP, 2000) 28, 262-263. The beginnings of this project as a current subject of study are usually traced to JB White *The Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1973).

46. RH Weisberg & J-P Barricelli 'Literature and the Law' in J Gibaldi & J-P Barricelli (eds) *Interrelations of Literature* (New York: Modern Language Assoc, 1982) 150.

47. Above n 7.

48. RM Cover 'Violence and the Word' (1986) 95 Yale L Journ 1609.

the negative in the 'continuing debate' over law and literature has been forcefully presented by Richard A Posner, a judge and legal academic. Posner undertakes a practical analysis of the potential benefits of this interdisciplinary activity for the understanding of law. Working within his own disciplinary framework, he evaluates the utility of literary texts and interpretive theory for the study of law. Though well-read and appreciative of the humanistic value of literature, he concludes that neither its examples nor its theorists have much to offer law in practice. The differences between the two institutions, their varying tolerance for individual creativity and openness to multiple interpretations, among others are too great. In effect, Posner reinforces the boundaries of the law, and stresses the need for specialist knowledge as a pre-requisite to contributing to its development. 'The biggest danger in any disciplinary field is amateurism'.<sup>49</sup> The two exceptions to this enclosure within the existing contours of the law are the study of the regulation of literature by law, and the study of legal rhetoric as a means of improving forensic argument. On balancing the possibilities and dangers he can only profess 'warm though qualified enthusiasm' for this interdisciplinary project in his conclusion.<sup>50</sup>

The idea that law and literature structure reality through language remains central to an understanding of their relations. One writer who has examined this capacity in both fields is the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Like Gillian Beer, Bourdieu uses the term 'field' in a scientific sense, as a force field, as 'a method of representing the way in which bodies are able to influence each other'.<sup>51</sup> In the course of analysing 'the juridical field' Bourdieu describes the power of the law in linguistic terms: 'Law is the quintessential form of the symbolic power of naming that creates the thing named, and creates social groups in particular. It confers upon the reality which arises from its classificatory operations the maximum permanence that any social entity has the power to confer upon another, the permanence we attribute to objects'.<sup>52</sup> A classic example of the law's power to create a new social group by inventing a new name is that of 'pensioner,' a new social identity brought into being in Britain by the Old Age Pensions Act 1908. A more striking example of performative language, or the 'linguistic capacity to make things true *simply by saying them*,' is provided by Bourdieu's translator, Richard Terdiman: 'the monarch's power to ennoble commoners simply by dubbing them and proclaiming that they are now titled'.<sup>53</sup> Language is integral to 'the entire practical activity of 'world-making'

---

49. RA Posner *Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1988) 363.

50. *Ibid*, 353.

51. Beer above n 43, x.

52. P Bourdieu 'The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field' (1987) 38 *Hastings L Rev* 838.

53. R Terdiman 'Translator's Introduction' (1987) 38 *Hastings L Rev* 805.

(marriages, divorces, substitutions, associations, dissolutions)' that makes up everyday work in and under the law.

The creative work of naming and bringing forth new visions for society is associated in the modern world with literature, and Bourdieu acknowledges this power in his study of 'the field of cultural production'.<sup>54</sup> Citing his favourite examples from nineteenth-century France, Flaubert and Manet, he attributes to writers and artists 'the properly symbolic power of showing things and making people believe in them, of revealing in an explicit, objectified way the more or less confused, vague, unformulated, even unformulable experiences of the natural world and the social world, and bringing them into existence'.<sup>55</sup> Manet, with his paintings of 'the urban landscape in its ordinary triviality' exemplifies the artist as creator, one who inaugurates a 'real symbolic revolution', offering 'new categories of perception and evaluation of the world'.<sup>56</sup> Bourdieu's developed sense of where power resides in society prevents him from idealising or over-valuing the role of the artist: 'the symbolic revolution is doomed, most of the time, to remain confined to the symbolic domain.' However, he avoids pessimistic under-valuations of the 'Poetry makes nothing happen' kind, quoting Sartre's dictum that 'words can wreak havoc.' The field of cultural production is part of the social world, but it has a relative autonomy which allows for a greater freedom of expression, and which provides the conditions for writers and artists to 'bring into public and thus official and open existence, when they show or half-show, things which existed in an implicit, confused or even repressed state.'

As a sociologist Bourdieu is alert to the relative power of different speakers in all social spaces, including the legal and cultural fields, which are therefore sites of political conflict. He is also interested in tracing the power relations between fields, and his account of the juridical field begins by refuting theories which stress the autonomy of law. Just as Robert Cover identifies law's dependence on an underlying matrix of social narratives, so Bourdieu insists on the influence of existing social institutions and understandings upon legal world-making: 'It would not be excessive to say that [law] *creates* the social world, but only if we remember that it is this world which first creates the law'.<sup>57</sup>

This insistence on the social context of the law and its speech lends a political realism to Bourdieu's sense of the capacity of legal language to make new worlds. The symbolic acts of the law tend to reinforce the status quo or to announce

---

54. P Bourdieu *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993; R Johnson (ed)).

55. P Bourdieu 'The Intellectual Field: A World Apart' in M Adamson (ed) *In Other Words: Essays on a Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 146.

56. *Ibid*, 149.

57. Bourdieu above n 52, 839.

changes already emerging in society. He recognises the transformative potential of symbolic acts, but also that utterances alone cannot achieve social change:

The will to transform the world by transforming the words for naming it, by producing new categories of perception and judgment ... can only succeed if ... they announce what is in the process of developing.<sup>58</sup>

To revert to our example of old age pensions and the consequent emergence of a new form of social identity, the pensioner, the Act put forward by Lloyd George in 1908 grew out of a complex of factors, including longer life spans for skilled workers, new economic understandings of the causes of poverty, debates about the theory and administration of charity, and the recognition of a national interest in the health of the population.<sup>59</sup> Overall, Bourdieu's realism harmonises with that of Robert Frost's persona, who knows that his questioning will have no effect unless his neighbour can begin to formulate new ideas about the fence for himself.

Not only does Bourdieu's subtle account of worldmaking through language confirm the relationship between law and literature, it also shows how close that relationship is. Barbara Leckie has integrated Bourdieu's writings on the two fields, and she concludes that:

The law could not likely effect its revolutions without the literary and [a]esthetic 'revolutions' to which it is inextricably wedded.... Symbolic revolution then forms the link between law and literature.<sup>60</sup>

This insight directs us to particular instances or cases of 'symbolic revolution', moments of crisis in which the struggle over certain words or forms of representation can be traced in both the legal and the literary fields, stories in which symbols developed in one migrate to the other. In undertaking such a study we must examine in detail the institutional organisation of each field at particular times, the social and political networks of important practitioners, and the language and the forms of representation employed in a variety of texts around the border between literature and law.

Yet if we return to the story of Robert Frost and the *Plaut* case, we observe a link between law and literature which is by no means a revolutionary one. The persona in 'Mending Wall' speaks hypothetically of removing the fence, but significantly continues to repair it thoroughly. He is no demolisher of traditional orders. Likewise, Bourdieu recognises that writers may put their symbolic power 'at

---

58. Ibid.

59. For an account of this context, see WR Cornish & G de N Clark *Law and Society in England: 1750-1950* (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) 450-454.

60. B Leckie 'The Force of Law and Literature: Critiques of Ideology in Derrida and Bourdieu' (1995) 28 *Mosaic* 131.

the service of the dominant',<sup>61</sup> and consciously or unconsciously reproduce existing understandings of society by recycling dominant symbols, forms and discourses. Frost's poem balances a language of conservatism against a potentially revolutionary one. Its interest is in staging a dialogue, and thereby raising a question. Frost exercised a similar caution when it came to the revolution in poetic form being carried out by his contemporaries, Ezra Pound and TS Eliot, refusing the radical dream of 'free verse' and instead adapting traditional narrative and poetic forms to the everyday speech and situation of rural New England. His compromise brought him the respect of many of his poetic peers (though not Eliot), and a wide public audience, particularly through his inclusion in school and university curricula. He was awarded four Pulitzer Prizes, the last in 1943, 20 years before his death. William H Pritchard comments that these latter years 'were those of a man whose productions as a poet, for the first time in his career, took a position secondary to his life as a public figure, a pundit, an institution, a cultural emissary'.<sup>62</sup> Frost accepted an appointment as Poetry Consultant to the Library of Congress in 1958. By then, according to Mark Richardson, 'he had achieved a celebrity and popular prestige unprecedented for an American poet'.<sup>63</sup> His visibility in the fields of culture and power was enhanced in 1960, when he read a poem at the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy. The poem, 'For John F Kennedy His Inauguration,' which included an older work, 'The Gift Outright,' sees the poet welcome the opportunity of consorting with politicians as presaging 'a next Augustan age':

A golden age of poetry and power  
Of which this noonday's the beginning hour.<sup>64</sup>

In literary history the 'Augustan age' refers to the reign of the Roman emperor Augustus, when the poets Horace, Virgil and Ovid flourished, and to the period in eighteenth-century English culture, when writers such as Pope, Johnson and Swift revered and emulated the values and forms of the original Augustans. The Augustan age stands then for a conservative and aristocratic culture committed to the imitation of Nature and of inherited literary forms.<sup>65</sup> As a cultural ideal it sits oddly with the ceremonials and the realities of a democratic republic; as an anachronistic ideal it

---

61. Bourdieu above n 55, 146.

62. WH Pritchard *Frost: A Literary Life Reconsidered* 2nd edn (Amherst: Massachusetts UP, 1993) 241.

63. M Richardson *The Ordeal of Robert Frost* (Urbana: Illinois UP, 1997) 33.

64. R Frost 'For John F Kennedy His Inauguration' in *In the Clearing* (London: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1962) 30.

65. For a brief account of the sources and meaning of Augustanism, see A Fowler *A History of English Literature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) ch 7. See also the definition of this term provided in M Wynne-Davies (ed) *Bloomsbury Guide to English Literature: The New Authority on English Literature* (London: Bloomsbury, 1989) 330–331.



still provides us with a glimpse of another, older form of social organisation in which literature and law were not separated by a wall or regarded as natural enemies. In Frost's America, however, despite his involvement in a campaign to free Ezra Pound from detention on charges of treason, and a state visit to President Krushchev, the dream of a new Augustan age proved a short-lived fantasy. As Pritchard puts it, 'The final lesson appeared to be that poetry and power only went together in poems'.<sup>66</sup>

Robert Frost's reputation as 'the quintessential American poet'<sup>67</sup> was not diminished, however, and so it was that the aphoristic sentences of 'Mending Wall' could be abstracted from the subversive musings of his persona and used to defend the law's boundaries in the Supreme Court case of *Plaut v Spendthrift Farm*. The openness of the literary text made it useful to Scalia J as the capstone of a strong conservative defence of separation of powers, and equally useful to Breyer J as the strategic tool for a moderate reformist critique. The poetic quotations are like windfall apples blown across the wall into the neighbouring field of the law. Their circulation proves that the absolute separateness or autonomy of the two domains cannot be sustained. The study of law's language opens up the cultural context, the ideological choices, and the rhetorical work which underlie the pronouncement of the authoritative word. The law and literature project adopts a critical perspective towards both its constituent fields – and their border.

---

66. Pritchard above n 62, 255.

67. Ibid, 250.