After section 64 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 insert —
In this Division—
"majority verdict direction" means an explanation that it is possible, or may be possible in some circumstances, for the jury to return a majority verdict instead of a unanimous verdict.
Note
Section 46 of the Juries Act 2000 provides for majority verdicts.
The trial judge must not direct the jury to persevere to reach a unanimous verdict at the same time as (or immediately before or immediately after) the trial judge gives a majority verdict direction.
The trial judge may give a majority verdict direction to the jury whether or not the trial judge has previously directed the jury to persevere to reach a unanimous verdict.
Note
R v Ahmet; DPP v Ahmet [2009] VSCA 86 includes a statement that it is preferable for the trial judge to direct the jury to persevere to reach a unanimous verdict before the trial judge gives a majority verdict direction. Under this provision, it is not necessary to do so.
Any rule of common law under which a trial judge is required or permitted to direct the jury to persevere to reach a unanimous verdict at the same time as (or immediately before or immediately after) the trial judge gives a majority verdict direction is abolished.
Notes
1 This provision abolishes the rule attributed to
R v Muto &
Eastey [1996] 1 VR 336 and applied in
R v Ahmet; DPP v Ahmet [2009] VSCA 86.
2 Section 4 applies generally to override any rule of law or practice to the contrary of this Act.
(1) This section applies to a trial in which there is more than one offence in respect of which the jury may return a verdict.
Example
Section 421 of the Crimes Act 1958 provides that on an indictment for murder a person found not guilty of murder may be found guilty of other offences, including manslaughter.
(2) The trial judge may direct the jury on the order in which the jury must consider the offences.
Example
In a homicide trial, the trial judge may direct the jury to consider the offence of manslaughter only if the jury first finds the accused not guilty of murder.
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) prevents the trial judge from directing the jury on the order in which the jury may consider the offences.
(1) The trial judge may direct the jury on the order in which it must consider the following matters—
(a) some or all of the elements of an offence charged or an alternative offence;
(b) defences to an offence charged or an alternative offence;
(c) the matters in issue;
(d) an alternative basis of complicity in the commission of an offence charged or an alternative offence.
Note
This may take the form of an integrated direction or factual question under section 67.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) prevents the trial judge from directing the jury on the order in which the jury may consider the matters referred to in that subsection.
Any rule of common law under which a trial judge is not permitted to direct the jury on the order in which it must consider any of the following matters is abolished—
(a) the offences in respect of which the jury may return a verdict;
(b) the elements of an offence charged or an alternative offence;
(c) defences to an offence charged or to an alternative offence;
(d) the matters in issue;
(e) an alternative basis of complicity in the commission of an offence charged or an alternative offence.
Notes
1 This provision abolishes the rule attributed to
Stanton v R
[2003] HCA 29; (2003) 198 ALR 41 and followed in Medici v The Queen
[2013] VSCA 111 and Smith v The Queen [2013] VSCA 112.
2 Section 4 applies generally to override any rule of law or practice to the contrary of this Act.".